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Abstract
Thanks to recent ¯ndings based on survey data, it is now well known that ¯rms
di®er from each other with respect to their price-reviewing strategies. While some
¯rms review their prices at ¯xed intervals of time, others prefer to perform price
revisions in response to changes in economic conditions. In order to explain this
fact, some theories have been suggested in the literature. However, empirical
evidence on the relative importance of the factors determining ¯rms' di®erent
strategies is virtually nonexistent. This paper contributes to ¯lling this gap by
investigating the factors that explain why ¯rms follow time-, state- or time- and
state-dependent price-reviewing rules. We ¯nd that ¯rms' strategies vary with
¯rm characteristics that have a bearing on the importance of information costs,
the variability of the optimal price and the sensitivity of pro¯ts to non-optimal
prices. Menu costs, however, do not seem to play a signi¯cant role.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research, devoted to
improving the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic behaviour, has made clear
that a thorough understanding of the extent and causes of the sluggish adjustment of
nominal prices is crucial to the design and conduct of monetary policy.
In this regard, an important conclusion that emerges from the literature is that ¯rms
di®er from each other with respect to their price-reviewing or price-setting strategies,
and that the di®erent strategies are all widespread in the economy.1 A second important
conclusion is that the e®ects of monetary policy may depend crucially on the underlying
mechanism of ¯rms' price adjustment, namely on whether ¯rms follow state- or time-
dependent price-setting rules.2 Understanding the factors that lie behind ¯rms' choice
of di®erent price-reviewing strategies is thus an issue of paramount importance.
This paper adds to this strand of the literature by studying the determinants of the
choice of the price-reviewing strategies followed by ¯rms. On the theoretical front, there
is now a signi¯cant literature that directly addresses this issue, but a corresponding
empirical contribution is virtually nonexistent.
Using the information from a ¯rm-level survey, this paper investigates the main
reasons that lead ¯rms to select time-dependent, state-dependent or a combination of
both price-reviewing practices, which we shall denote by time- and state-dependent
price-reviewing strategy. Speci¯cally, we explore the information available on ¯rms'
pricing decisions using a multinomial probit model to study the link between their
1For instance, Fabiani et al. (2006) ¯nd that in the Euro Area about 34 percent of the ¯rms follow
time-dependent rules, 20 percent follow state-dependent rules and the remaining 46 percent follow
a combination of both, i.e., follow time-dependent rules under normal circumstances, but change to
state-dependent price-reviewing rules upon the occurrence of speci¯c events.
2See, among many others, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Caplin and Spulber (1987), Dotsey et al.
(1999), Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), Dotsey and King (2005), Burstein and Hellwig (2007), Midrigan
(2007), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Bils et al. (2009), Woodford (2009).
2price-reviewing strategies and a number of their characteristics. The identi¯cation of
such characteristics will allow us to anticipate changes in ¯rms' behaviour, i.e., changes
from time- to state-dependent and vice-versa, as a reaction to changes in economic
conditions and therefore to anticipate changes in monetary policy transmission. In
addition, our exercise will also allow us to answer several interesting questions, from
which the following are just some examples: How do the the frequency of price changes
and the lags of price reaction to shocks vary between time- and state-dependent ¯rms?
How important are menu and/or information costs for the choice between time- and
state-dependent price-reviewing rules? Does the type of price-reviewing strategy vary
with the size of the ¯rms? Does the cost structure matter for the ¯rm's strategy? How
does uncertainty a®ect ¯rms' choice? Are ¯rms more likely to be state-dependent when
they operate in more competitive environments?
A potential disadvantage of using survey data for this type of investigation is that,
in our case, these are reported, not actual data, and thus, it is impossible to know
how accurate the answers provided in the survey are. However, in this particular case,
there does not seem to be a valid alternative to identify the price-reviewing strategies
at the ¯rm level. In particular, quantitative data on the frequency of price changes
or the duration of price spells does not allow addressing the issue. On the one hand,
these data do not distinguish between price changes and price reviews, the latter being
the variable of interest in this paper. On the other hand, time-dependent rules as
implied by models with information costs, are not distinguishable, in practice, from
state-dependent rules, as the frequency of price changes or of price reviews depends on
the underlying relevant parameters that may change over time. Therefore, by simply
looking at the relationship between the frequency of price changes or the duration of
price spells and the state of the economy, it is not possible to tell whether a ¯rm follows
time-dependent, state-dependent or a combination of both price-reviewing strategies
3(see Blanchard and Fischer (1989) ch. 8).3
In this paper we document that the type of price-reviewing strategy followed by
¯rms has important consequences for the frequency of price changes and the speed
of price reaction to shocks. In particular, ¯rms that follow state-dependent price-
reviewing rules change their prices more frequently and react more quickly to demand
and cost shocks than ¯rms following time-dependent strategies.
We also ¯nd that the type of price-reviewing strategy varies signi¯cantly with those
¯rm characteristics used to measure the importance of information costs, the variability
of the optimal price and the sensitivity of pro¯ts to sub-optimal prices. Menu costs,
i.e. costs of changing prices such as the cost of printing and distributing new price
lists, do not seem to play a signi¯cant role in explaining the di®erent price-reviewing
strategies. More speci¯cally, we document that smaller ¯rms, ¯rms for which changes
in prices of raw materials are important factors for pricing decisions or that operate
in competitive environments are more likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing
rules. In turn, larger ¯rms, ¯rms for which information costs or changes in wages
are important factors for pricing decisions, or that operate in the services sector are
more likely to follow time- or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
Interestingly, we also ¯nd that the time- and state-dependent strategy is closer to the
time-, than to the state-dependent price-reviewing rule. Yet, the two price-reviewing
rules are very distinct. In fact, for many regressors, the magnitude of the impact on
the likelihood of the two categories is di®erent and, moreover, the probability of a ¯rm
3An important strand of the literature on time-dependent pricing models assumes that the timing
of price reviews and/or price changes is periodic and exogenous, i.e., taken as given and hence neither
explained nor assumed to be a®ected by the state of the economy, the timing of the shocks or mon-
etary policy rules. Notable examples of these, sometimes called exogenous time-dependent models,
include Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). In this paper, we are interested in explaining the choices
between time- and state-dependent price-reviewing practices, so that we focus on the sometimes also
called endogenous time-dependent models in which the optimal timing of price-reviewing depends on
underlying relevant parameters, which may change over time.
4choosing between one of the two strategies may go in the opposite direction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background which underlies the estimated model. Section 3 describes the dataset used
in the paper and presents some preliminary results. Section 4 presents the estimated
model and discusses the main results. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks,
and ¯nally an Appendix provides an explanation of how the di®erent variables were
constructed.
2 Theoretical background
The process of charging an optimal price by ¯rms may be thought of as involving
price-reviewing and price-setting as two distinct activities. Price reviewing may be
de¯ned as the activity of assessing whether the ¯rm's current price is appropriate or
not, and in general precedes the price-setting decision which involves adjusting the
price to the optimal level. In practice, a price review may or may not be followed by a
price adjustment, so that if the two activities entail di®erent types of costs it may be
the case that the ¯rm follows distinct price-reviewing and price-setting strategies.4
This section brie°y reviews the literature on ¯rms' price-reviewing strategies and
discusses the implications for those strategies stemming from changes in the relevant
parameters.
Models without costless information
We start by summarizing the implications for the ¯rms' price-reviewing strategies of
4Survey data indicate that ¯rms review their prices infrequently, and that not all price reviews
yield a price adjustment. For instance, for the Euro Area, Fabiani et al. (2007) document that the
frequency of price reviews is generally higher than the frequency of price changes. The surveys show
that in most Euro Area countries the modal number of price reviews lies in the range from one to four
times a year, but most ¯rms actually change their prices only once a year. In the case of Portugal,
these ¯gures are 2 and 1, respectively.
5the models suggested in Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2010), which assume that
¯rms do not have access to costless information about current economic conditions.
In order to make the presentation easier let us start by assuming that: i) the
e±ciency loss of the ¯rm (out-of-equilibrium cost) may be captured by a quadratic
function, L=µ[p(t)-p*(t)]2, where µ measures the sensitivity of pro¯ts to the price gap,
i.e., the deviation of the actual price, p(t), from the optimal price, p¤(t); ii) the optimal
price follows a random walk with Gaussian innovations with variance ¾2 per unit of
time;5 and iii) the ¯rm has to pay a ¯xed information cost, ½, in order to review its
price. Under these circumstances, it may be shown (see Caballero (1989)) that it is
optimal for the ¯rm to follow a time-dependent price-reviewing strategy, where the





According to equation (1), the optimal length for price-reviewing is increasing on
the information costs and decreasing on the parameters measuring e±ciency loss from
sub-optimal prices and the variability of the underlying optimal price.6
In the model suggested in Caballero (1989) there are no menu costs, i.e., costs
of changing prices, so that every price review implies a price change. In a recent
contribution, Alvarez et al. (2010) generalise Caballeros's model by assuming that the
¯rm has to pay an information cost to review the price and a menu cost if it decides to
5Notice that µ depends on the parameters of the demand and cost functions and that, in particular,
µ is increasing with the elasticity of demand faced by the ¯rm. The variance ¾2 may be seen as
measuring the volatility of demand and cost functions.
6The model by Caballero (1989) was further developed by Bonomo and Carvalho (2004) and Reis
(2006). Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), by assuming the existence of menu and information costs that
are borne together, provide a model with time-dependent price-reviewing in which prices are ¯xed
in between price reviews. Reis (2006) models imperfect information as arising from a ¯xed cost of
observing the state. In the general case, the optimal planning intervals are not always the same, since
they depend recursively on the state of the economy at the last revision date. However, in standard
frameworks the optimal price-reviewing rule is also purely time dependent.
6change the price. In this model, price reviews and price changes are separate activities:
a ¯rm may assess the adequacy of its current price, i.e., conduct a price review, and
decide not to adjust if the current price is inside the inaction band (stemming from
the presence of menu costs). The timing of each price review is predetermined as it is
decided on the previous revision date. Nevertheless the process of price reviewing is
also state-dependent, because the optimal time between price reviews is a function of
the expected price gap at the time of price-reviewing.7
Models with costless information
In contrast to Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2010), Woodford (2009) and
Bonomo et al. (2010) assume that ¯rms have access to partial information at no cost,
on which they support the decision to conduct a price review.
In Woodford's (2009) model, which draws on the theory of rational inattention
proposed by Sims, the assumptions about information availability have important im-
plications for the strategy of price reviews.8 In this model it is assumed that: i) the
¯rm obtains full information about the economy's state at the moment when it decides
to pay the information costs and review the price; ii) partial information about current
conditions is available between the occasions when the ¯xed information cost is paid,
which allows ¯rms to decide whether or not to review prices; and iii) the memory of
the ¯rm (information on the time at which the ¯rm last reviewed its price) is as costly
as information about current conditions external to the ¯rm.9 Under these circum-
7In a similar approach Abel et al. (2009) address consumption portfolio problems under the as-
sumption of separate observation (information) and adjustment (transaction) costs. In general the
model has elements of both state- and time-dependent behaviour. Interestingly, the authors show
that for su±ciently small ¯xed transaction costs the two processes of "observation" and "transaction
dates" will eventually converge to pure time-dependent rules. Intuitively, when the ¯xed transaction
costs are not too large compared to the observation costs, the agent will ¯nd it optimal to synchronize
observation and transaction dates, in order to avoid "wasting" observation costs without using the
new information to undertake a transaction.
8See Sims (1998, 2003, 2006).
9This assumption may be justi¯ed in the context of the theory of rational inattention: the cost of
7stances, it is shown that the optimal timing of price reviews follows a state-dependent
rule. However, when the information cost is su±ciently large, the dependence of the
optimal hazard (that indicates the probability of a price review) on the current state
is attenuated, so that in the limit, when the information cost becomes unboundedly
large, the resulting model approaches one with a constant hazard rate as assumed in
Calvo (1983). If instead, memory is costless, the optimal hazard also depends on the
number of periods since the last price review. If memory is costless and the information
costs are unboundedly large, the model becomes one in which prices are reviewed at
deterministic intervals as in Caballero (1989).
In the model suggested in Woodford (2009) there are no menu costs dissociated
from information costs, so that every price review implies a price change, as in Ca-
ballero's model. More recently, Bonomo et al. (2010) developed a model that allows
for dissociated menu and information costs and assumes a continuous °ow of partial
information which may be factored into pricing decisions at no cost, together with
some information that is only incorporated infrequently due, for instance, to gathering
and processing costs. Nevertheless, the price-reviewing process emerges as having both
time- and state-dependent components, as in Woodford (2009)'s memory costless case.
It is state-dependent because the ¯rm has access to partial information on which it
conditions the decision to undertake a price review, and it is time-dependent because
the decision to undertake a price review also depends on the time elapsed since the last
date when information was fully factored into the pricing decision.
Impact on the price-reviewing strategy of changes in the relevant parameters
We have seen that in some of the models surveyed above changes in the importance
any kind of information is assumed to be the same as any other, because the relevant bottleneck is
limited attention on the part of the decision maker, rather than anything about the structure of the
economy that obscures the value of certain variables.
8of menu and information costs may alter the nature of the price-reviewing strategy. In
particular, in the context of the time-and state-dependent model suggested in Alvarez
et al. (2010) and Abel et al. (2009) a decrease in the importance of menu costs makes
the model converge towards a time-dependent rule. The intuition is that a decrease
in menu costs makes the width of the inaction band to converge to zero, making the
source of the state-dependent component in the price-reviewing strategy to vanish. In
turn, an increase in information or observation costs makes the state-dependent model
in Woodford (2009) to converge to a pure time-dependent rule with a constant hazard
rate as assumed in Calvo (1983) or, in the absence of memory costs, one in which
prices are reviewed at predetermined intervals as in Caballero (1989). The intuition is
similar: an increase in the information costs attenuates the dependence of the optimal
hazard on the current state, making the optimal time between two consecutive price
reviews to converge towards a pure time-dependent rule as information costs become
unboundedly large.
The impact on the optimal price-reviewing strategy of changes in the variability of
the optimal price (¾2) and the sensitivity of ¯rm's pro¯ts to sub-optimal prices (µ) may
be discussed in a context of a model in which ¯rms have access to partial information
about current conditions, as in Woodford (2009). In this model, an increase in µ or
in ¾2 may be thought of as bringing about both a decrease in the information costs
(an increase in the uncertainty about the price gap or on the costs associated to a
given price gap makes information more valuable, reducing its relative cost) and an
increase in the relative cost of ¯rm's memory (the higher is ¾2 or µ the less valuable
the memory will be). Thus, an increase in µ or in ¾2, to the extent that it decreases
the information costs on the current conditions and increases the memory costs of the
¯rm, will increase the probability of a ¯rm following state-dependent price-reviewing
strategies as opposed to time-dependent or time- and state-dependent rules.
9In this article, we will look into the factors that may explain why ¯rms follow state-
dependent, time-dependent or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
For that purpose, in section 4 we will consider an econometric model that relies on
the theoretical approaches presented in this section, whose relevant factors, in face of
the discussion above, include the menu costs, the information costs, the variability of
the optimal price and the sensitivity of ¯rm's pro¯ts to sub-optimal prices. Overall,
in our estimated model, we expect high menu costs, small information costs, large
variability of the optimal price and high sensitivity of pro¯ts to sub-optimal prices,
ceteris paribus, to increase the likelihood of state-dependent price-reviewing or, more
precisely, the likelihood of a state-dependent component in the ¯rm's price-reviewing
strategy. Similarly, low menu costs, high information costs, small variability of the op-
timal price and low sensitivity of pro¯ts to sub-optimal prices, are expected to increase
the likelihood of a time-dependent component in the ¯rm's price-reviewing strategy.
3 The Data
3.1 Data sources
The data used in this study come from a survey about price setting practices carried out
by the Banco de Portugal.10 In this survey, regarding their price reviewing strategies,
¯rms were asked the following question:
The price in your company is reviewed (without necessarily being changed):
1) at a well-de¯ned frequency (annually, quarterly,..),
2) generally at a de¯ned frequency, but sometimes also in reaction to market con-
ditions (change in the price of raw materials or in demand conditions) or
10Further details on this survey may be found in Martins (2010).
103) without any de¯ned frequency, being reviewed in reaction to market conditions
(changes in price of raw materials or in demand conditions).
The responses to this question, the dependent variable in our model, are interpreted
as reproducing time-dependent, time- and state-dependent, and state-dependent price-
reviewing practices by Portuguese ¯rms, respectively.
Besides the questions on price-reviewing practices, the survey also contains infor-
mation on a large set of ¯rms' characteristics. These include information on the size
and sector of the ¯rm, its main market (domestic versus external market), destination
of sales (wholesalers vs. retailers, private vs. public sector), number of competitors,
type of relation with customers (long-term vs. short-term), factors of product compet-
itiveness (price vs. quality, di®erentiation vs. after sales service), price discrimination
(same price for all customers vs. decided on a case-by-case basis), importance of
changes in di®erent factors for price adjustments (price of raw materials, wage costs,
demand, competitors' prices), duration of products (short vs. long-duration), informa-
tion of wage-setting practices, price setting decisions (own company vs. external entity,
main customers vs. main competitors), and reasons for postponing price changes (the
risk that competitors do not follow, existence of implicit or written contracts, cost
of changing prices, costs of collecting information, absence of signi¯cant changes in
variable costs, preference for maintaining prices at psychological thresholds, etc.).
In total, for estimation purposes, we have detailed information on 906 ¯rms from
di®erent areas of economic activity. More speci¯cally, our sample includes ¯rms with
20 or more employees, from which almost 90 percent belong to Manufacturing (NACE -
classi¯cation of economic activities - 15 to 37) and the remaining to Services (NACE 60
to 64, 80 and 85 - Transport, Storage and Communication, Education and Healthcare).
Sectors such as agriculture, construction, or wholesale and retail trade are not included.
113.2 Preliminary data analysis
As mentioned above, the type of price-reviewing strategy by Portuguese ¯rms is our
variable of interest. Table 1 summarises some useful information on this variable by
displaying the distribution of the observed price-reviewing strategies in our sample,
as well as comparable ¯gures for other European countries taken from Fabiani et al.
(2007).11
Table 1
Price-reviewing strategies - International evidence
Share of ¯rms in percentage¤
PT ES DE NL BE IT AT
Time-dependent 32 33 26 36 26 40 41
Time- and state-dependent 25 28 55 18 40 46 32
State-dependent 43 39 19 46 34 14 27
¤ PT-Portugal, ES-Spain, DE-Germany, NL-Netherlands, BE-Belgium
IT-Italy and AT-Austria; Source: Fabiani et al. (2007).
Table 1 reveals that in Portugal 32 percent of the ¯rms in the sample follow time-
dependent rules while 43 percent follow state-dependent rules, and the remaining 25
percent follow time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies, i.e., generally re-
view prices at a de¯ned frequency, but sometimes also in reaction to market conditions.
From Table 1, we can also see that ¯gures for Portugal do not di®er signi¯cantly from
the general picture obtained from several European countries. Even though the dis-
tribution of the price-reviewing strategies varies somewhat across countries, we notice
that the three alternative price-reviewing strategies are equally important, as none
emerges as clearly dominating the others. For instance, from Table 1 we see that the
11Figures for Portugal in Table 1 do not strictly coincide with those reported in Fabiani et al. (2007)
due to di®erences in the samples used.
12proportion of time-dependent ¯rms is above 25 percent in all cases, and that the im-
portance of the time- and state-dependent strategy varies between 18 percent (NL)
and 55 percent (DE).
Table 2
Price-reviewing strategies - Sectoral and size breakdown
Share of ¯rms in percentage
Sectors Size¤
Total Manufacturing Services Small Large
Time-dependent 32 30 47 30 41
Time- and state-dependent 25 25 25 22 35
State-dependent 43 45 28 48 24
¤ Small and large ¯rms are ¯rms with up to 250 employees and more than 250 employees,
respectively.
Table 2 considers the breakdown by sector and ¯rm size of the di®erent price-
reviewing strategies. The table suggests the existence of strong heterogeneity in these
two dimensions. Indeed, the share of ¯rms following time-dependent rules is higher in
services than in manufacturing, and tends to increase with the size of the ¯rms.
As in similar studies, the survey data also contains information on the frequency
of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks. Table 3 reports the average
frequency of price changes as reported by the ¯rms in the sample. From the table it can
be seen that on average, time-, time- and state- and state-dependent ¯rms have di®erent
frequency of price changes. In particular, state-dependent ¯rms emerge as adjusting
prices more frequently than ¯rms following time-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
Indeed, 17 percent of ¯rms following state-dependent rules change their prices at least
once per quarter, while 8 percent do it at least once a month. On the other hand,
only 8 percent of ¯rms following time-dependent rules change their prices at least once
13per quarter. The frequency of price changes for time- and state-dependent ¯rms seems
to be somewhere in between that of time- and state-dependent ¯rms. The analysis
based on visual inspection of Table 3 is corroborated by a formal non-parametric Â2
homogeneity test, which rejects the null hypothesis of equal frequency of price changes
across the three types of ¯rms.12
Table 3
Frequency of price adjustment
Share of ¯rms in percentage
Frequency of price Time- Time- and state- State-
adjustment dependent dependent dependent
1 - Once per month or more 3 5 8
2 - Once per quarter 5 9 9
3 - Twice a year 16 14 17
4 - Once a year 61 57 40
5 - Less than once a year 16 15 26
Table 4 reports the lags or price reaction to signi¯cant positive cost and demand
shocks.13 Simple visual inspection of the table suggests that the speed of price adjust-
ment to shocks varies according to the type of price-reviewing strategy. In particular, in
both cases, time-dependent ¯rms seem to be slower to adjust than ¯rms following state-
dependent price-reviewing strategies. Indeed, 26 percent of ¯rms with state-dependent
price-reviewing rules adjust their prices in the ¯rst month after a positive cost shock,
while 58 percent do it in the ¯rst three months. The corresponding ¯gures for time-
dependent ¯rms are 14 and 38 percent, respectively. The results for ¯rms with time-
and state-dependent rules suggest that the speed of price adjustment is somewhere
12The outcome of the test is Â2(8)=42.4, so that the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 percent level.
13This information was explored by Dias et al. (2010) to investigate the ¯rms' characteristics that
explain why some ¯rms react to shocks faster than others.
14in between that of time- and state-dependent ¯rms. Once again, the analysis based
on visual inspection is corroborated by formal non-parametric Â2 homogeneity tests,
which clearly reject the null hypothesis of identical adjustment lags across the three
types of ¯rms.14
Table 4
Speed of price response to positive demand and cost shocks
Share of ¯rms in each category
Time- Time- and state- State-
Price adjustment lag dependent dependent dependent
Positive cost shocks:
1 - Less than one week 3 6 6
2 - From one week to one month 11 16 20
3 - From 1 month to 3 months 24 28 32
4 - From 3 to 6 months 19 21 18
5 - From 6 months to one year 33 24 18
6 - More than one year 10 5 7
Positive demand shocks:
1 - Less than one week 3 4 4
2 - From one week to one month 7 11 15
3 - From 1 month to 3 months 17 18 23
4 - From 3 to 6 months 13 21 13
5 - From 6 months to one year 22 21 14
6 - More than one year 38 26 31
Overall, Tables 3 and 4 show that whether ¯rms follow time-, time- and state-,
or state-dependent price-reviewing strategies has important consequences for the fre-
quency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks. This, in turn, may
14For the positive cost and demand shocks the results of the tests are Â2(10) = 34:26 and Â2(10) =
32:65, respectively, so that the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 percent level for the two tests. The
results for negative cost and demand shocks, as regards the price adjustment lags for the three type
of price-reviewing strategies, including the Â2 homogeneity tests, are qualitatively similar.
15be expected to have important consequences for monetary policy, as its e®ects would
depend on the distribution of ¯rms in terms of their price-reviewing strategies. Thus,
anything that changes this distribution will a®ect the speed with which prices react to
monetary policy shocks. For instance, if the choice of price-reviewing strategy varies
with ¯rm size (as suggested by Table 2), then, it may be expected that the e®ects of
monetary policy will be di®erent in countries with di®erent ¯rm size distribution as the
masses of time- and state-dependent ¯rms will also be di®erent. But not only structural
characteristics of an economy may in°uence monetary policy. The type of monetary
policy may also have an impact on the e®ects of monetary policy: monetary policy
rules aimed at stabilising the economy, to the extent that they alter the proportion of
¯rms in each category, will change the frequency of price changes and consequently the
speed of price reaction to monetary policy shocks.15
4 An econometric model for the price-reviewing
strategies
In order to gauge the impact of the di®erent covariates on the type of price-reviewing
strategy, we estimate a multinomial probit model, where the dependent variable, yi;j,
j=1, 2, 3 indicates one of the three response categories: time-, time- and state- , or
state-dependent price-reviewing strategy.16
The choice of the set of regressors used in the empirical model was guided by the
literature on price-reviewing strategies, summarised in section 2. As discussed there,
the relevant factors determining the type of pricing policy may be divided into four
15For instance, by reducing in°ation uncertainty it is likely that monetary policy will reduce the
variability of ¯rms' optimal price, which, according to the discussion in section 2, is likely to increase
the probability of ¯rms following time- or time- and state-dependent rules.
16For a derivation of this model, see Train (2009).
16categories: menu costs, information costs, variability of the optimal price and the
sensitivity of pro¯ts to sub-optimal prices. As direct quantitative data is not available,
we use proxies as the regressors for each one of the four categories. The di®erent
regressors are described in the Appendix together with some summary statistics.
Table 5 presents the average marginal e®ects of each of the covariates on the prob-
ability of a ¯rm following either a time-, a time- and state- or a state-dependent price-
reviewing strategy, computed from the estimated parameters of the multinomial probit
model.17
Menu costs
According to the theoretical models surveyed above, we may expect high menu costs
to increase the likelihood of a state-dependent component in a ¯rm's price-reviewing
strategy. However, in our estimated model, menu costs do not emerge as a relevant
factor to discriminate among the three alternative price-reviewing strategies. This
of course, may stem from the type of covariate we use. In our model, the regressor
"importance of menu costs" is a dummy variable that equals one if the ¯rm considers
that those costs are important or very important to explain the existence of price
rigidity, and is zero otherwise. But, it might be the case that two ¯rms, with a very
di®erent degree of price stickiness attach the same degree of importance to menu costs.
In this case, our measure of menu costs would be unable to discriminate among ¯rms
with di®erent price-reviewing strategies. Of course, it may also be the case that menu
costs, if they are very small when compared to information costs, do not in fact play
an important role for the decision on the type of price-reviewing strategy (see Ball and
Mankiw (1994), Zbaracki et al. (2004) and Woodford (2003, 2009)).
17Figures in Table 5 refer to the output of an independent multinomial probit. As a robustness
check, we also estimated a multinomial probit allowing for the possibility of correlated errors. However,
the estimates for the average marginal e®ects are virtually unchanged. We note that by construction
the average marginal e®ects for each regressor in Table 5 add up to zero.
17Information costs
In this group of regressors, we consider both a direct measure of the information
costs, which we label "importance of information costs" and two more indirect measures
labelled "price discrimination" and "size".
According to the theoretical literature reviewed in section 2, we may expect high
information costs to increase the likelihood of time- or time- and state-dependent price-
reviewing strategies, as opposed to state-dependent rules. The variable, "importance
of information costs" maps directly into the theories presented in section 2. The "price
discrimination" variable indicates whether a ¯rm charges di®erent prices to di®erent
customers or not. Our assumption is that a ¯rm which discriminates prices must be
able to process all the necessary information very cheaply at the time of charging a
di®erent price. In that sense, ¯rms that price discriminate may be expected to prefer
state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. With respect to the "size" variable, our
assumption is that, in principle, larger ¯rms will tend to have larger product portfolios
and also that their decision structure is less centralized than smaller ¯rms. For that
reason, we expect larger ¯rms to have higher information costs, and therefore to be
more likely to follow time- or time- and state-dependent price reviewing strategies, as
opposed to state-dependent ones.
Regarding the variable "importance of information costs", we see that ¯rms for
which information costs are important are less likely to follow state-dependent price-
reviewing strategies. In particular, for a ¯rm for which information costs are important
or very important, the probability of following a state-dependent price-reviewing strat-
egy is 6.9 percentage points (pp) lower than the probability for an otherwise identical
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Number of observations: 906
Log pseudo-likelihood: -894.88897
Wald Â2(26)=148.80 (P=0.000); MacFadden's Pseudo R2=0.0791.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at 1, 5
and 10 percent level, respectively.
19In the case of the type of pricing policy, namely whether the ¯rm sets a single price
or discriminates the price among the customers, we obtain a result that is line with
our predictions. That is, we estimate that, for a ¯rm that discriminates prices among
their customers, the probability of following a state-dependent rule is 14.3 pp higher
than the corresponding probability for a ¯rm that does not.
With respect to "size", the last variable in this group, we ¯nd that larger ¯rms
tend to prefer time- or time- and state-dependent price reviewing rules in detriment
of state-dependent rules. According to our estimates, the probability of a large ¯rm
following a state-dependent price-reviewing rule is 22.2 pp lower than the probability
for a comparable small ¯rm. This result is also in line with the preliminary ¯ndings in
section 3.18
Variability of the optimal price
This category includes a group of variables deemed to a®ect directly or indirectly
the variability of the optimal price of the ¯rm: "changes in the prices of raw materials",
"changes in wages", "changes in demand" and "explicit contracts".
The ¯rst three covariates measure the importance of changes in the prices of raw
materials, in wages and in demand for the ¯rm's decision of a price change. Estimates
in Table 5 show that ¯rms where the prices of raw materials are considered impor-
tant or very important for price changes are more likely to follow a state-dependent
price-reviewing strategy. In particular, the probability of such ¯rms following a time-
dependent price-reviewing strategy is 17.7 pp lower, than the probability for an oth-
erwise identical ¯rm. In contrast, the more important changes in wages are, the more
likely it is that a ¯rm follows a time-dependent price reviewing rule. In both cases the
18The variable "size" may also be seen as a measure of the ¯rm's market power. In that sense, it
could equally be considered in the group of variables aimed a measuring the "e±ciency loss". Larger
¯rms, ceteris paribus, have a higher degree of price setting power (through a higher market share) and
thus, face a less elastic demand, which makes pro¯ts less sensitive to non-optimal pricing, increasing
the likelihood of a time-dependent component in the ¯rm's price-reviewing strategy.
20results accord with intuition: in general, the price of raw materials is highly volatile,
which will increase the variability of the optimal price and thus may be expected to
increase the likelihood of state-dependent behaviour; in turn, we may expect changes
in wages to occur at well-de¯ned frequencies (once a year, usually) and thus their im-
portance for price changes to be negatively correlated with the uncertainty surrounding
the optimal price. Interestingly, the larger importance of changes in demand for the de-
cision of a price change does not seem to have a bearing on the type of price-reviewing
strategy followed by Portuguese ¯rms.
The existence of written or "explicit" contracts has been suggested in the literature
as an important explanation for price rigidities at the ¯rm level. With such contracts
¯rms aim at building long-term relationships with their customers in order to stabilise
their future sales. Customers, on the other hand, are attracted by a constant price
because it makes their future costs more predictable and helps to minimize transaction
costs (e.g., shopping time). According to Table 5, the existence of explicit contracts
has also a bearing on the type of price-reviewing strategy followed by Portuguese ¯rms.
In particular, we see that ¯rms with a large proportion of sales under written contracts
are less likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing rules and more likely to follow
time- and state-dependent rules. This accords with the idea that contracts are in fact
also used to reduce the variability of the optimal price.
E±ciency loss
This category includes a group of variables expected to be related to the deter-
minants of the sensitivity of ¯rm's pro¯ts to deviations from the optimal price (e.g.,
demand elasticity or slope of the cost function). In this category, we included the
following regressors: "number of competitors", "price competitiveness", "changes in
competitor's prices", "intermediate goods" and "services".
21The number of competitors, which is used to measure the degree of competition
faced by ¯rms, may be expected to have a signi¯cant impact on the choice of a price-
reviewing strategy, because it is known that the more competitive a sector is, the more
sensitive pro¯ts are to sub-optimal prices (Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010)). Thus, ceteris
paribus, ¯rms operating in more competitive environments may be expected to prefer
state-dependent practices. Our estimates show that this is indeed the case. From Table
5, we see that, for a ¯rm operating in a competitive environment, the probability of
following a time-dependent price-reviewing rule is 7.2 pp lower than the probability for
and otherwise identical ¯rm.
As it is well known, ¯rms can compete in many di®erent dimensions: price, quality,
after-sales service, etc. In that sense, we added to our model a variable that indicates
whether the price is the main factor of competitiveness of that ¯rm. The results that
we obtain are that ¯rms which compete in price (as opposed to other dimensions
of competition) are more likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
According to Table 5, the probability for such a ¯rm of following a state-dependent
rule is 11.2 pp higher than for an otherwise identical ¯rm. This is the expected result,
as the pro¯ts of ¯rms that compete in price are more sensitive to deviations from
optimal price.
As regards the regressor "changes in competitors' prices", we notice that a ¯rm for
which such changes are important or very important for pricing decisions is less likely
to follow a time-dependent rule and more likely to follow a time- and state-dependent
rule, but the likelihood of following a state-dependent rule is not a®ected. This is a very
interesting result, which may be explained in a context of strategic complementarities
(see, for instance, Bonomo and Carvalho (2004)). In such a context, a ¯rm should not
be expected to follow a simple time-dependent rule, as such rule does not accommodate
the possibility of a ¯rm reacting to changes in the ¯rms' relevant environment. In
22contrast, by being time- and state-dependent the ¯rm has the possibility of generally
review their prices at well de¯ned frequencies, but sometimes also in reaction to market
conditions, namely changes in competitors' prices.
As earlier results suggested (see Table 2 in Section 3), from Table 5 we ¯nd that
¯rms that operate in the services sector are more likely to follow time-dependent price-
reviewing strategies than ¯rms that operate in the manufacturing sector. In fact,
the covariate "services" shows up with a very large impact, with estimated positive
marginal e®ects on time-dependent behaviour of 12.5 pp. The type of price-reviewing
strategy also varies according to the type of market for the product. Firms that sell
their products to other ¯rms (intermediate goods) are more likely to follow state-
dependent rules than ¯rms whose products are mainly for ¯nal demand (whose main
destinations are wholesalers, retailers or consumers). These results may re°ect the
fact that services and ¯nal goods are typically more di®erentiated than manufacturing
and intermediate goods, and thus face a less elastic demand, which makes pro¯ts less
sensitive to non-optimal pricing.
Overall, the results in Table 5 show that the time- and state-dependent strategy is
closer to the time-dependent than to the state-dependent strategy, in the sense that
changes in regressors that bring about signi¯cant changes in the likelihood of one of the
two strategies usually also bring about changes of the same sign in the likelihood of the
other (even though in some cases not statistically di®erent from zero). However, the
results also show that time- and time- and state-dependent behaviour are to be seen as
two distinct choices. Indeed, for many regressors, the magnitude of the impact on the
likelihood of the two categories di®ers from each other and, moreover, the probability
of a ¯rm choosing between the two strategies sometimes goes in the opposite direction
as, for instance, in the case of a ¯rm for which changes in competitors' prices are
important or very important for pricing decisions.
235 Conclusions
This paper uses ¯rm-level data to look into the factors that may explain why ¯rms
follow time-, state-, or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
In line with the evidence found in other countries, Portuguese ¯rms are strongly
heterogeneous as regards their price-reviewing strategies. In our sample, 32 percent of
the ¯rms follow time-dependent, 43 percent state-dependent and the remaining 25 per-
cent time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Importantly, the frequency
of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks of time-dependent ¯rms is
signi¯cantly lower than that of state-dependent ¯rms, while ¯rms that are both time-
and state-dependent rank in between.
By estimating a multinomial probit model, we ¯nd that the type of price-reviewing
strategy varies signi¯cantly with those ¯rm characteristics that measure the impor-
tance of information costs, the variability of the optimal price and the sensitivity of
pro¯ts to sub-optimal prices. In particular, we document that factors that increase the
costs of information required for the process of price reviewing tend to decrease the
likelihood of state-dependent rules or to increase the likelihood of time- and time- and
state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Factors that increase the cost of deviations
from the optimal price decrease the likelihood of a ¯rm following time-dependent rules
whereas variables that increase the variability of the optimal price increase the prob-
ability of a ¯rm following state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Menu costs do
not emerge as playing an important role.
We also ¯nd that the time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategy is closer
to the time-dependent, than to the state-dependent strategy. Interestingly, however,
¯rms for which changes in competitors' prices are important for pricing decisions are
less likely to follow time-dependent rules and more likely to follow time- and state-
24dependent rules, suggesting that the existence of strategic complementarities plays an
important role in discriminating among these two types of ¯rms.
The fact that the proportion of time- and state-dependent ¯rms depends on the
state of the economy has important consequences for monetary policy. Monetary policy
aimed at stabilising the economy (by reducing in°ation uncertainty) might increase the
proportion of time-dependent ¯rms, which, in turn, to the extent that such ¯rms display
lower frequency of price reviews or of price changes, would tend to increase the real
e®ects of monetary policy. A simple implication of these results is that DSGE models
designed for the conduction of monetary policy should be improved in order to account
for the heterogeneity and endogeneity of ¯rms' price-setting strategies. Otherwise, the
implications of changes in monetary policy rules generated by these models might be
very misleading.
25Appendix
In this Appendix, we describe the covariates used in the multinomial probit model
whose results are presented in section 4, and provide the corresponding summary
statistics. All the covariates used in the model are dummy variables. The details
are as follows:
Importance of menu costs { Equal to one if the menu costs implied by price changes
are ranked by the ¯rm as an important or a very important factor to postpone price
changes.
Importance of information costs { Equal to one if the costs involved in collecting
the relevant information for price decisions are ranked by the ¯rm as an important or
a very important factor to postpone price changes.
Price discrimination { Equal to one if the price of the ¯rm's product is decided on
a case-by-case basis.
Size { Equal to one if the number of employees is larger than 250.
Changes in prices of raw materials { Equal to one if they are considered as impor-
tant or very important for the ¯rm's decision of a price increase or a price decrease.
Changes in wages { Equal to one if they are ranked as important or very important
for the ¯rm's decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Changes in demand { Equal to one if they are ranked as important or very important
for the ¯rm's decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Explicit contracts { Equal to one if the percentage of sales under written contracts
is larger than 25 percent of total sales.
Number of competitors { Equal to one if the number of ¯rm's competitors is greater
than or equal to 5.
Price competitiveness { Equal to one if the ¯rm considers the price as a very
26important factor for competitiveness.
Changes in competitors' price { Equal to one if they are important or very important
for the ¯rm's decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Intermediate goods { Equal to one if "other companies" is the main destination of
sales (as opposed to wholesalers, retailers, Government, consumers).
Services { Equal to one if the ¯rm operates in the Services sector.
Table A1 summarizes the relative importance in the sample of the covariates de¯ned
above. The entries in the table record the share of ¯rms in each category. For instance,
from the table we see that around 93 percent of the ¯rms consider that changes in prices
of raw materials are important or very important for price decisions on either price
increases or price decreases, and that the distribution of such ¯rms does not change with
¯rms' size, but varies across sectors, being relatively more frequent in manufacturing
than in services. In contrast, only about 30 percent of the ¯rms produce intermediate
goods, i.e., sell their main product to other companies (as opposed to wholesalers,
retailers or the Government) and are relatively more frequent in the services sector.
27Table A1: Main characteristics of the sample
(Share of ¯rms in each category in percentage)
Total Sectors Firms' size
Manufacturing Services Small Large
Importance of menu costs 57.1 57.0 57.3 57.9 53.5
Importance of information costs 40.6 41.2 34.8 41.6 36.5
Price discrimination 36.5 36.6 36.0 36.3 37.6
Size (large ¯rms) 18.8 17.9 27.0 { {
Changes in prices of raw materials 93.4 95.7 71.9 93.8 93.4
Changes in wages 84.8 84.9 83.1 86.3 78.2
Changes in demand 77.7 77.5 79.8 78.0 76.5
Explicit contracts 33.0 31.0 51.7 30.8 42.4
Number of competitors 75.7 75.6 76.4 79.9 57.6
Price competitiveness 61.5 62.2 55.1 61.0 63.5
Changes in competitors' prices 74.6 74.3 77.5 73.9 77.6
Intermediate goods 29.9 28.9 39.3 30.8 25.9
Services 9.8 - - 8.8 14.1
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